Abstract-In this paper, we discuss a naive method of randomness reduction for cryptographic schemes, which replaces the required perfect randomness with output distribution of a computationally secure pseudorandom generator (PRG). We propose novel ideas and techniques for evaluating the indistinguishability between the random and pseudorandom cases, even against an adversary with computationally unbounded attack algorithm. Hence, the PRG-based randomness reduction can be effective even for information-theoretically secure cryptographic schemes, especially when the amount of information received by the adversary is small. In comparison to a preceding result of Dubrov and Ishai (STOC 2006), our result removes the requirement of generalized notion of "nb-PRGs" and is effective for more general kinds of protocols. We give some numerical examples to show the effectiveness of our result in practical situations, and we also propose a further idea for improving the effect of the PRG-based randomness reduction.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Backgrounds
R
ANDOMNESS is an essential resource for cryptography, and is one of the most important ingredients of applications in information theory, e.g., efficient computation by probabilistic algorithms. Most of the existing schemes are designed by basing on an (implicit) assumption that perfect random sources are freely available. However, in practice such perfect (or even approximately perfect) sources are either not available, or available but cost consuming. Hence, it is necessary to relax the requirements for quality and amount of randomness used in the schemes. Some preceding works have shown that, although imperfect random sources (entropy sources) can be used for noncryptographic schemes and some kinds of cryptographic schemes [10] , [12] , [19] , [25] , [29] , [30] , it is essentially impossible for many cryptographic purposes to replace the perfect random sources with imperfect . A preliminary version of this paper was presented as two papers [22] and [23] at the 4th International Conference on Information Theoretic Security, Shizuoka, Japan, December [3] [4] [5] [6] 2009 .
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ones without diminishing quality of the scheme [6] , [12] , [20] . Hence, the possibility of relaxing the requirements for quality of randomness is limited; therefore, it is significant, especially for cryptographic purposes, to relax the requirements for the amount of randomness, i.e., to perform randomness reduction or derandomization.
There have been proposed many randomness reduction techniques, such as [1] , [3] , [8] , [16] , and [24] , which are information-theoretically indistinguishable, i.e., the result of the randomness-reduced protocol is statistically indistinguishable from that of the original protocol. However, those techniques are scheme-dependent, and the negative results mentioned in the previous paragraph suggest that information-theoretically indistinguishable universal randomness reduction techniques using a single (imperfect) random source are unlikely to exist. (In the aforementioned impossibility statement, the condition of using only one source is important, since it is known that two independent weak random sources can be used to extract almost perfect random bits [10] , [26] . Here, we emphasize that the latter preceding results require weak but information-theoretic random sources, i.e., their randomness is measured regardless of the distinguisher's computational complexity.) On the other hand, there exists a well-known computationally indistinguishable universal randomness reduction technique, which is to replace the required randomness with outputs of (computationally) secure pseudorandom generators (PRGs).
For an intermediate situation, Dubrov and Ishai introduced in their work [11] a generalization of PRGs, called pseudorandom generators, that fool non-Boolean distinguishers (nbPRGs, in short). They gave a concrete example of nb-PRGs under a certain computational assumption. By the definition of nb-PRGs, for any efficient algorithm with sufficiently small output set, the algorithm with uniform input distribution and the one with input distribution replaced with the output of an nb-PRG have statistically indistinguishable output distributions. Hence, information-theoretically indistinguishable randomness reduction for such a randomized algorithm is possible by using an nb-PRG under the corresponding computational assumption. More precisely, the statistical distance between the output distributions in random and pseudorandom cases is bounded in terms of hardness of the underlying computational problem. They also applied nb-PRGs to information-theoretically indistinguishable randomness reduction of private multiparty computation protocol (see [11, Section 6.2] ). Hence, their technique is also effective for some kinds of cryptographic protocols.
However, there are some drawbacks of the aforementioned randomness reduction technique using nb-PRGs for cryptographic protocols, as follows. First, the security evaluation 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE method of Dubrov and Ishai in [11] depends on the property of the considered protocol that calculation of a secret protected by the protocol does not use the randomness to be replaced with nb-PRGs, and this property fails for many cryptographic protocols. Second, the construction of nb-PRGs presented in [11] is based on a certain nonstandard computational assumption, and no nb-PRGs based on standard assumptions (e.g., hardness assumptions of decisional or computational Diffie-Hellman problem) have been obtained so far. (More precisely, in fact it has been mentioned in [11] without proof that any secure PRG in usual sense is also an nb-PRG with suitably chosen parameters. However, in the implication the overhead in the bounds of advantages of distinguishers frequently becomes heavy in practical settings; therefore, the implication is not efficient. See Proposition II.1 and a subsequent remark for details.) Moreover, in contrast to the notion of usual PRGs that is well known even for nonexperts of cryptography, the notion of nb-PRGs seems not yet popular even for experts of cryptography. Hence, it is worthy to investigate a similar information-theoretically indistinguishable randomness reduction technique based on usual (secure) PRGs.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we reveal that information-theoretically indistinguishable randomness reduction is possible by using secure PRGs in a naive manner. More precisely, we consider the situation of randomness reduction that (a part of) the required perfect randomness for a cryptographic protocol is replaced with output of a PRG whose indistinguishability is based on an underlying hard computational problem. Then, our result implies that the difference of success probabilities of any attack by an adversary (within the scope of the security definition of the original protocol) between the random and pseudorandom cases is bounded by a function of both of hardness of the underlying problem for the PRG and, roughly speaking, the amount of information used for the attack by the adversary. (We notice that, to make the bound of difference of attack success probabilities sufficiently small, it is actually required that the amount of information received by the adversary does not exceed a certain threshold calculated from parameters and other characteristics of the protocol.)
A remarkable characteristic of this result is that the bound is independent of any property, including computational complexity, of the attack algorithm. This means that our result can be applied even to cryptographic schemes with information-theoretic security. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that, intuitively speaking, the computational environment in which the hardness of the underlying problem for the PRG is evaluated can be chosen independently of the adversary's computational environment. A typical example of the property is that the randomness reduction can be indistinguishable for quantum adversary even when the underlying problem for the PRG is classically hard but quantumly easy (e.g., integer factoring and discrete log).
In comparison to the preceding result of Dubrov and Ishai [11] mentioned in Section I-A, our result has the following advantages. First, our result uses PRGs in a usual sense instead of the generalized and less popular notion of nb-PRGs. (In fact, we can prove that secure PRGs with sufficiently long seed lengths are also nb-PRGs, as mentioned in [11, Observation 3.1] ; see Proposition II.1 in Section II.) As a result, our randomness reduction technique can be based on any standard security assumption (such as classical hardness of integer factoring or discrete log) instead of nonstandard assumption used in [11] for constructing concrete nb-PRGs. Second, our result is applicable to more general kinds of cryptographic schemes than [11] , since it is allowed that calculation of a secret protected by the protocol does use the randomness to be replaced with PRGs (it may not use the randomness in the case of [11] ; see the discussion in Section III-B). We notice that our result requires a condition that, intuitively speaking, the amount of information used by an adversary for the attack is sufficiently small (such a condition was also required in the case of [11] ). However, the numerical example given later shows that our result is still applicable to some existing schemes; sufficiently indistinguishable randomness reduction is possible by using a PRG whose seed size is significantly shorter than the size of the original required randomness.
In order to explain the essence of our main result that covers various situations, in this and the next paragraphs we present an example of our result applied to an intuitive special case. In the example, we consider a function whose output value is to be protected. An adversary tries to make a guess about the value . Now we suppose that the adversary can make use of some information on the input of , which is calculated from by a certain function where denotes the set of possible information received by the adversary (hence ). One may imagine that the information has "leaked" from the storage of the input and the function represents the information leakage. Let denote an attack algorithm of the adversary, where denotes the set of possible guesses derived by the attack. Moreover, we introduce an auxiliary algorithm that evaluates whether the adversary's guess about is "correct" or not . Then the success probability of the adversary's guess is the probability that , where we define by . This process is represented by the upper half of Fig. 1 . Here, we assume that the algorithms , , and are all efficient, while we do not have any assumption on the computational complexity of (denoted by a circled arrow in the picture).
Now suppose that the function is secure in the sense that when the input of is chosen uniformly at random, the adversary's success probability is bounded by a sufficiently small value. We would like to bound, by a sufficiently small value, the difference between and the adversary's success probability in the case that the input of is given by a PRG (with output set ). If the adversary receives no information (i.e., ), then even the computationally unbounded attack algorithm can nothing better than the perfectly random case. On the other hand, if the adversary receives much information (i.e., is too large), then the adversary would be able to break the pseudorandomness of and to make a much better guess than the perfectly random case. Now our result provides a quantitative argument for the separating point of those two extreme situations. Given any elements 
and
, we introduce an auxiliary algorithm such that if and otherwise (1) (see also the lower half of Fig. 1 ). Our result tells us the way of deriving appropriate algorithms such as from the current situation (see also Section III-C). Note that is composed of efficient algorithms only, not involving the attack algorithm . In this situation, if the complexity of is bounded by a constant and the advantage for -time algorithms of distinguishing the outputs of from perfectly random outputs is bounded by , then our result implies that Therefore, we have a lower bound of the allowable amount of information received by the adversary.
Our evaluation technique is effective especially in the situations that the information received by the adversary is sufficiently small. A typical case is that a small piece of the randomness, which is to be replaced with pseudorandomness, is distributed to each of a large number of players for a protocol, including a limited number of adversaries. Such applications include parallel computation over honest-but-curious modules, secret sharing [4] , [27] , broadcast encryption [14] , traitor tracing [2] , [9] , [17] , and collusion-secure fingerprint codes [5] , [28] . In later section, we present a numerical example of applications of our result to randomness reduction of information-theoretically secure existing schemes, by using a collusion-secure code in [21] and a secure PRG in [13] based on the DDH assumption. For the parameter choices in the example, we see that the seed lengths of the PRG which are approximately 75% to 0.0002% of the original perfectly random bits suffice to bound the differences between random and pseudorandom cases by sufficiently small values. This shows that our result is indeed effective for existing cryptographic schemes.
Moreover, the observation for the case of collusion-secure codes provides a novel technique to improve the effect of randomness reduction. The technique is to divide the randomness that is the target of the randomness reduction into several pieces, in such a way that only a smaller component of the information received by the adversary depends on each piece of the randomness. Then, we replace each piece of the randomness with output of an independent PRG, and we evaluate the total difference between random and pseudorandom cases by using "hybrid argument." By applying the technique to the aforementioned example of collusion-secure codes, we see that in the setting, the total seed length of the independent PRGs is reduced to approximately 29 times as short as the case of the plain randomness reduction. This shows that our proposed technique is also effective.
C. Organization of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes some definitions, notations, and terminology used throughout this paper, and mentions some properties. In Section III-A, we introduce a certain kind of diagram expressions of cryptographic procedures and some relevant notions, which play a key role in our main theorem. Section III-B is devoted to a toy example of our main theorem in order to motivate us to introduce further auxiliary definitions in later sections and to help understanding of the main theorem. In Section III-C, we introduce an auxiliary diagram expression of an algorithm associated with the original cryptographic scheme, which also plays a central role in our main theorem. Section III-D presents the main theorem of this paper and its proof. Section III-E collects some remarks on our result. In order to show a numerical example of the main result, in Section IV-A we summarize some definitions and properties for an existing PRG given in [13] . In Section IV-B, we summarize some definitions for collusion-secure codes given in [21] , which are an example of information-theoretically secure schemes. In Section IV-C, we propose a technique to improve the effect of randomness reduction as mentioned in the final paragraph of Section I-B. Then in Section IV-D we give the numerical example based on the results in previous sections. Technical details omitted in Section IV are supplied as the appendix. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
In this section, we summarize some definitions and notations used throughout this paper. In this paper, any algorithm is probabilistic unless otherwise specified. Let denote the uniform probability distribution over a finite set . We often identify a probability distribution with the corresponding random variable. We write to signify that is a particular value of a random variable . Let denote the set of nonnegative real numbers. Put . For any element of a set , let denote an algorithm that takes an input from and outputs 1 if and 0 if (i.e., that computes Kronecker delta). We identify the set of integers modulo naturally with . Moreover, we identify the set of -bit sequences with via binary expressions of integers. Let denote the bit length of an integer . To explain the results of this study, here we clarify some terminology used in this paper.
Definition II.1:
A complexity measure is a function on a set of algorithms that assigns to each algorithm its complexity .
Definition II.2: Among computational assumptions for security proofs, a computational power assumption means an assumption of the following type: "the adversary cannot solve a specified computational problem by a practical computational cost (e.g., computing time)." On the other hand, a computational hardness assumption means an assumption of the following type: "the complexity of an algorithm (in an explicitly or implicitly specified underlying set of algorithms) that solves a specified computational problem is lower bounded by a significantly large value."
In Definition II.1, the "complexity" may take various meanings depending on the context, such as time complexity on a fixed turing machine, circuit complexity with a fixed set of fundamental gates, average-or worst case running time on a fixed real computer, or space complexity. An important point is that a complexity measure depends on the choice of the computational environment in which each algorithm is executed. For example, when the computer is replaced with a new one which is twice as fast as the original, the complexity measure is also replaced with the one whose value is twice as small as the original. Therefore, any speedup of the adversary's computation induced just by an improvement of its computational environment (e.g., the number of computers for parallel computing), not by an algorithmic improvement, can be interpreted as a change of the complexity measure.
For Definition II.2, we notice that most of the existing cryptosystems that provide computational security are in fact based on computational power assumptions (in the aforementioned sense), e.g., assumption on infeasibility for the adversary of factoring 1024-bit RSA composites. On the other hand, our result in this paper (Theorem III.1) is based on a computational hardness assumption.
Let be a PRG with seed set and output set . In this paper, we deal with exact (concrete) security rather than asymptotic security; therefore, is a single algorithm rather than a sequence of algorithms with various seed lengths. The following notion of indistinguishability for PRGs is a natural translation of the conventional notion to the case of exact security and has appeared in the literature (except slight modification mentioned later), e.g., [13 An instance of -secure PRGs was given by Farashahi et al. [13] under DDH assumption, which is used in our numerical examples below, where the function is estimated in terms of complexity of the best known classical algorithm to solve the DDH problem (see Section IV-A for details). Note that there is a general tendency such that when the basic structure of the PRG is not changed but the seed length is increased, the PRG will be more indistinguishable, implying that the value of the function in Definition II.4 will be smaller. We also recall the definition of statistical distance. We notice that in practical applications of nb-PRGs, it is expected that the size of the output set of a distinguisher for an nb-PRG is frequently large, in which case the parameter for in the aforementioned proposition should be extremely small. This means that the implication of nb-PRGs from usual PRGs in Proposition II.1 is practically inefficient.
III. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN RESULT
A. Flowchart Expressions of Procedures
From now, we describe the idea of our main result of this paper. For the purpose, we need to introduce a formal expression of the flow of a protocol under consideration. This will be done by using some diagrams (directed graphs) as explained below.
First, we give a toy example to give an intuition for the diagram expression of a protocol or an algorithm. The diagram in Fig. 2 is a flowchart of an algorithm computing the value from inputs , and . (The parentheses in Fig. 2 signify examples of inputs and intermediate values in the algorithm; for example, we set in the example.) The two arrows toward the vertex " " represent the addition which is performed first. Then, the two arrows toward " " represent the multiplication which is performed secondly. The entire calculation is expressed as the concatenation of these two operations, which corresponds to the diagram in Fig. 2 .
In order to generalize the aforementioned toy example to more complicated protocols, we introduce some notations and terminology. In what follows, we assume, unless otherwise specified, that any directed graph with vertex set and edge set is finite (i.e., , ), acyclic (i.e., having no directed cycles), and simple (i.e., having no parallel edges). Let denote the set of predecessors of in , namely . Let and denote the sets of sources (i.e., vertices with no predecessors) and of sinks (i.e., vertices that are predecessors of no vertices) of , respectively. In the setting, we give the following definition.
Definition III.1: In this paper, a flowchart signifies a tuple satisfying the following conditions. 1)
is a directed graph. 2) To each vertex a finite set is associated; . 3) To each an algorithm is associated, where the output set of is and the input set of is the product of the sets over all ; .
Here, for a subset of , denotes the product of the sets over all . In the case of Fig. 2 , we set to be a directed graph with vertex set and four edges , , , and . We put , , and (we omit the concrete choices of the sets and in Fig. 2 ). We have , and the algorithms and correspond to the addition and multiplication given above, respectively.
In a manner similar to the expression of the calculation by Fig. 2 , we associate with each flowchart an algorithm as follows.
Definition III.2:
Let be a flowchart. We define an algorithm with input set and output set , in the following inductive manner. Suppose that an element is given for each as input for the algorithm . Then, when an element has been determined for every predecessor of a vertex but has not been determined, an element is determined as the output of the algorithm with input . Finally, outputs the tuple of elements with . The expressions of algorithms introduced by the aforementioned definitions will be used throughout this paper. More precisely, not only a protocol under consideration but also the process of security evaluation of the protocol, including the attack model, will be represented by using flowcharts.
B. Motivating Example of the Main Result
Here, we focus on an example of our main result mentioned in Section I-B (see Fig. 1 ), and give the statement and its proof specialized to this situation. It aims at motivating our definition of an "auxiliary flowchart" associated with each flowchart, which will be introduced below.
Recall that the upper half of Fig. 1 expresses a toy example of an attack model and security evaluation of computation of a function with private output. The flowchart representing the whole process is defined by using a directed graph with , where and we identify each vertex with the corresponding set in the collection . The edges of are , , , , and . We have , , , , , and . Now the attack success probability in the situation is equal to the probability that the algorithm defined from the flowchart as in Definition III.2 outputs 1 when the input is chosen from uniformly at random; . Let denote the attack success probability in the case that the input is generated by a PRG ; . Our aim here is to give a bound of the difference . Note that the difference is equal to the advantage of a "distinguisher"
for . By virtue of the observation, if the attack algorithm as well as the other algorithms in the flowchart is computationally bounded, then the algorithm will also be computationally bounded and the aforementioned difference can be immediately bounded by using an -secure PRG with respect to satisfying . However, in the setting of information-theoretic security, the attack algorithm is not necessarily computationally bounded; therefore, the aforementioned straightforward argument does not work.
To obtain an effective bound of the aforementioned difference regardless of the computational complexity of , we introduce a novel mathematical trick explained below. For any random variable on the input set , we have
Now for each and , we have where is the algorithm defined in (1). This implies that
Therefore by triangle inequality, we have
Here, the auxiliary algorithm is regarded as a distinguisher for . An important fact is that the distinguisher for is no longer relevant to the attack algorithm ; therefore, its advantage can be effectively bounded even if the attack algorithm has unbounded computational complexity.
If the PRG is -secure with respect to and we have and the quantities have a common upper bound for all and , then the advantages also have a common upper bound ; therefore,
We emphasize again that the resulting bound for the difference is not relevant to the computational complexity of the attack algorithm (on the other hand, the bound depends on the size of the input set of the attack algorithm ; therefore, should be sufficiently small in order to make the bound effective).
The aforementioned auxiliary algorithms are also expressed by using flowcharts in the following manner. For each , we have Now note that the event is equivalent to that the output of satisfies , where denotes an algorithm that outputs 1 if and only if the input is (i.e., that computes Kronecker delta). By using this notation, we have where denotes an algorithm that computes the logical AND of two input bits. This equality implies that , where is the flowchart corresponding to the lower half of Fig. 1 . We emphasize that the resulting flowchart does not involve the attack algorithm , which allows the algorithm to have low computational complexity even if the attack algorithm is computationally unbounded. Summarizing, our novel mathematical trick is to "factor out" the (possibly computationally unbounded) attack algorithm from the original flowchart; then an upper bound for the difference of the attack success probabilities in random and pseudorandom cases can be given in terms of the advantage of a distinguisher defined by the resulting (somewhat modified) flowchart, which does no longer involve the attack algorithm. Our main result of this paper says how to construct such an auxiliary flowchart by "factoring out" the attack algorithm in more general settings.
Here, we notice that the technique to evaluate the difference of random and pseudorandom cases by the preceding result of Dubrov and Ishai [11] using nb-PRGs is essentially not effective in the aforementioned case. Roughly speaking, an nb-PRG is a PRG such that even if the output set of a distinguisher for is not (i.e., outputs more than one bits), the statistical distance of the output distributions of between random and pseudorandom cases is effectively bounded provided the output set of is not too large. To apply their randomness reduction technique using the nb-PRG , first we replace the uniform random variable on with the output of , and then we must find a decomposition of the algorithm of the form such that may have unbounded complexity but has bounded complexity and output set of bounded size. (If such a decomposition is found, then the output distributions of , hence those of , in random and pseudorandom cases have a sufficiently small statistical distance, as desired.) However, in the case of Fig. 1 it is essentially impossible to find such a decomposition of . Indeed, the possible choices of the efficient are the followings:
, or (the latter being trivial). In any case, the output set of includes either or , which should not be too small to make the original function secure in the random case (if or is too small, then the success probability to guess the output of cannot be negligibly small). Hence, the preceding technique in [11] is not effective for this example, which means that our result improves the preceding result significantly.
C. Definition of the Auxiliary Flowcharts
From now, we give a generalization of the construction of auxiliary flowcharts associated with a flowchart in the previous example. We suppose that a flowchart under consideration satisfies that for every (note that the example discussed in Section III-B satisfies the requirement). Moreover, we specify a subset and a source of the directed graph underlying the flowchart . Here, a choice of intuitively means that we evaluate the difference of some behavior of the algorithm between the case that a part of the input is chosen from uniformly at random and the case that it is chosen from by using a PRG, where the way to choose the remaining part of the input is not changed (in the example in Section III-B, corresponds to the set ). On the other hand, a choice of intuitively means that every algorithm with will be "factored out" from to make the auxiliary flowcharts; therefore, these algorithms may have unbounded computational complexity (in the example in Section III-B, consists of the vertex corresponding to the set ).
We need some more definitions. First, let be the set of all such that there is a path in from to which does not contain any vertex belonging to . By the definition, we have and the restriction of to the vertex subset has as the unique source (in particular, ). Intuitively, any vertex in not belonging to will not be affected by the change of the way to choose an element of . Now we define
In the example in Section III-B, the set consists of the vertices other than , consists of , and consists of (see below for a more "generic" example).
Recall that in the construction of an auxiliary flowchart in the example in Section III-B, the output set of was replaced with a singleton for an arbitrary element , while the input set of was followed by a Kronecker delta algorithm with an arbitrary element . Then, two output sets were combined by the logical AND function to make the sink unique in the resulting flowchart. We give a generalization of the construction. First, we introduce a symbol for each , and put which will corresponds to the output sets of the Kronecker delta algorithms. Second, we introduce another symbol that will be the unique sink of the resulting directed graph. Now the new vertex set is defined by where denotes the disjoint union. The new edge set is defined by
We be an algorithm, with input taken from the product of the sets over , that outputs 1 if all components of the input are 1 and outputs 0 otherwise (i.e., the logical AND operation). Thus, the new flowchart is defined, where and . One can verify that in the example in Section III-B, our definition of coincides with by setting and . Note that for the algorithm , all of the components of the input other than are specialized to the constant values ; therefore, essentially has input set and output set (i.e., we can regard as a distinguisher for a PRG used for generating an element of ). Here, we give an example to help understanding of the aforementioned construction. The upper half of Fig. 3 shows an example of a "generic" flowchart , where denotes a copy of . For simplicity, here we identify each vertex of the graph with the corresponding set ; the same identification will be applied to other cases as well, unless some ambiguity occurs. We put . In the figure, the three circled arrows signify that the corresponding algorithms may have unbounded computational complexity (which should be "factored out" to construct an auxiliary flowchart). Hence, we let consist of the terminal vertices of the circled arrows;
. Then by the definition, we have Let the symbols and correspond to the sets and , respectively; therefore, is identified with . On the other hand, let the symbol correspond to the set .
To obtain the edges of , we start with the subgraph of restricted to the vertex subset , and we add the arrows in from a vertex in to a vertex in (three arrows in total), the arrows from some to (two arrows in total), and the arrows from some vertex in to (three arrows in total). Thus, we obtain the flowchart as in the lower half of Fig. 3 , where (according to the definition) each set in the flowchart is replaced with a singleton for a specified element . As mentioned previously, the corresponding algorithm is essentially an algorithm with input set and output set .
D. Main Theorem
From now, we present our main theorem formally by using the aforementioned definitions. Here, we introduce some notations. Given a flowchart and a collection of random variables on the sets , let denote the output distribution of the algorithm with input given by the random variables . Let denote a collection of copies of . Then, our main theorem is described as follows. Moreover, by the definition of , the last value is equal to where the flowchart is corresponding to the given elements . By substituting the aforementioned equality for (3), we have (4) The same argument for instead of implies that
By using (4), (5) , and triangle inequality, we have
By the assumption, we have , and ; therefore, Since is -secure with respect to , the assumption on implies that (recall that is a nondecreasing function). By substituting these for (6), we have Note that the value in the last row does not depend on the elements . Since , the last sum is equal to By using the relation it follows that Hence Theorem III.1 holds.
For practical applications, we consider the situation that an attack by an adversary for a protocol "succeeds" if and only if every component of output of the algorithm is 1. We assume that an element of is originally given by a perfect random source and we would like to replace the perfect source with output of the PRG . In this setting, the quantity is the difference of the adversary's attack success probabilities between random and pseudorandom cases. Now, we choose as the set of all vertices corresponding to the output sets of the adversary's attack algorithms. Then, each vertex in corresponds to (a part of) the set of information received by the adversary. In this case, it is an important property that, by the definition of , the algorithm does not involve any attack algorithm of the adversary. Hence, the complexity of can be effectively bounded even if the attack algorithms have unbounded complexity; therefore, the assumption for Theorem III.1 can be indeed satisfied.
By Theorem III.1, the difference between random and pseudorandom cases is bounded well when the product of sizes of the sets is sufficiently small, which means intuitively the situation that the amount of information received by the adversary is sufficiently small. Moreover, the complexity measure can be chosen independently of the adversary's attack algorithms; therefore, the bound of the difference between random and pseudorandom cases given by Theorem III.1 is independent of the adversary's computational environment (for example, the adversary may use quantum computers even if the complexity measure is according to classical computation).
E. Miscellaneous Remarks
Here, we collect some remarks on our result. 1) A frequently asked question on our result: Why the adversary cannot recover the presently used seed of the just computationally secure PRG by using algorithms with unbounded complexity (which would break the proven indistinguishability between random and pseudorandom cases)? Answer: Our result requires the property of the situation that the set of possible information received by the adversary is sufficiently small. In such cases, the information actually received by the adversary is too scanty to recover the seed, even though the adversary can perform powerful computation. 2) Our result may provide a significant insight for randomness reduction of not only protocols with information-theoretic security, but also those with computational security. For instance, when the considered computationally secure protocol is postquantum (i.e., secure against quantum adversaries), our result shows that indistinguishable randomness reduction is still possible even by using a PRG whose underlying computational problem is easy for quantum computers. The reason is that the indistinguishability of the PRG is evaluated with respect to a fixed complexity measure that is independent of the adversary's (quantum) algorithm; therefore, may be classical. 3) Our result gives a bound of the difference of security between random and pseudorandom cases, which depends on computational complexity of the considered protocol. This means that the efficiency of the protocol contributes directly to the security level, which is a rare phenomenon. Indeed, in usual situations efficiency of the considered protocol contributes just indirectly to the security level, e.g., in such a way that the more efficient a protocol, the larger the encryption/decryption keys used by the protocol, and hence the higher the achieved security level. 4) A typical situation where our result works effectively is the following: there are a large number of players for the protocol, including a small number of adversaries, and just a small piece of an element generated from the randomness (which is the target of the randomness reduction) is distributed to each player. In such a situation, the amount of information on the randomness received by an adversary will be small, as required in our result. Now imagine that if we could know in advance who are the adversaries among all players, then smaller randomness would suffice for fighting the exposed adversaries directly, since the information on the randomness received by the adversaries is now small. However, actually we have no practical way to know it in advance, and it is inevitable to fight huge possibilities of where the adversaries are hiding, requiring further randomness. The randomness for the latter purpose looks less essential than the former one, and our PRGbased randomness reduction can be intuitively thought of as reducing the latter inessential randomness. The security notion for PRGs (Definition II.4) fits the purpose very well; advantages of distinguishers are bounded regardless of the bit positions (corresponding to the place of adversaries, in the aforementioned situation) that are picked up from outputs of a PRG. 5) In the aforementioned argument, we have carefully avoided the term "computationally unbounded adversary"; instead, we used, e.g., "computationally unbounded attack algorithm." The reason is that the exact meaning of "computationally unbounded adversary" seems depending on people, and someone may think that existence of "computationally unbounded adversary" breaks not only computational power assumptions but also computational hardness assumptions (in the sense of Definition II.2). If it is the case, then our result cannot be applied against "computationally unbounded adversary," since our result is based on a computational hardness assumption on indistinguishability of the PRG. Nevertheless, our result can imply the following: by PRG-based randomness reduction, the random and pseudorandom cases can be indistinguishable even against an impractically strong adversary who is supposed to be able to perform arbitrary algorithms in arbitrary (theoretically consistent) computational environments. Hence, anyway our result proves indistinguishability between random and pseudorandom cases much stronger than ordinary computational indistinguishability.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we present a numerical example of our main result to show that, for an existing information-theoretically secure cryptographic scheme with reasonable parameters, the scheme based on a pseudorandom source instead of a perfectly random one can still achieve a sufficient security level (against attack algorithms with unbounded computational complexity) by using an existing PRG with significantly short seed length. More precisely, in order to apply Theorem III.1 to a practical situation, one should know the following three data: the security property of a PRG (i.e., the function ), the complexity of the auxiliary algorithms (which are practically almost equal to the complexity of the original cryptographic scheme), and the amount of the information received by the adversary (e.g., the size of the set in the example in Section III-B). In the numerical example, we evaluate the aforementioned quantities for an existing scheme and an existing PRG.
Moreover, in this section we also present a novel improvement of our PRG-based randomness reduction technique for information-theoretically secure schemes. Since the technique is scheme-dependent and is difficult to describe in a generalized manner like Theorem III.1, here we only explain the technique by showing its application to the same existing cryptographic scheme, but it would not be difficult to apply the technique to other individual situations. Some technical part of the numerical example will be supplied as the appendix.
A. Existing PRG
The PRG used in our numerical example is the one given by Farashahi et al. [13, Section 4 .1] under the DDH assumption, which we call a DDH generator in this paper. Here, we summarize notations and some properties; technical details omitted here will be described in Appendix A.
The DDH generator with integer parameter has seed set and output set , where is a Sophie-Germain prime (i.e., both and are prime numbers). It is shown in [13] that is -secure with respect to a complexity measure , where is the set of classical algorithms, is determined by using the data of computer experiments by Lenstra and Verheul [18] , and we put with a function given in [13, Section 2.4] (see also Appendix A).
The seeds and outputs of are sequences of finite field elements rather than bit sequences. For the purpose of our discussion, we try to convert them into bit sequences. First, we give some notations. For integer parameters and , define two maps and by where and are defined by and we let . Then, the following property holds. The latter equality is similarly proven. Hence, Lemma IV.1 holds. Let denote the composition of followed by , which is also a PRG with seed set and output set . Note that the map just outputs some lower bits of the original output of ; therefore, the issue of complexity of may be ignored for simplicity in practical situations. Then, Lemma IV.1 and the aforementioned choice of imply (by ignoring complexity of ) that the PRG is -secure with respect to the same , where
B. Collusion-Secure Codes
In our numerical example, we choose collusion-secure codes [5] (also referred to as fingerprinting codes) as an instance of existing information-theoretically secure cryptographic schemes to which our result is applied. We summarize some definitions and notations; further technical details omitted here will be described in Appendix B.
Here, we deal with a concrete scheme of collusion-secure codes given by Nuida et al. [21] . The scheme is an improvement of the celebrated Tardos code [28] and its construction is based on a simpler probability distribution than Tardos code, which is desirable for our discussion. The scheme in [21] consists of a codeword generation algorithm and a tracing algorithm . An overview of the protocol and the security model are described as follows. The players of the protocol are a provider and a number, say , of users. Some users are adversaries, called pirates, not known by the provider. The protocol proceeds as follows.
1) The provider generates by a probability distribution and a binary matrix of size , where is a given parameter, the latter matrix being generated according to the former probability distribution. Here, th row of the matrix represents a codeword of length that will be sent to the th user. Let denote the set of all possible outputs of . 2) The provider distributes the codewords to the corresponding users. Hence, the pirates receive their own codewords; let denote the collection of the pirates' codewords. Let be the set of all the possible collections , and the process that the collection is extracted from the output of is expressed by an algorithm . [21] 3) The pirates execute an attack algorithm to generate from a pirated word , where "?" denotes an "erasure symbol." We emphasize that the standard assumption on for collusion-secure codes, called marking assumption [5] , does not restrict the computational complexity of . 4) Finally, the provider executes , with and the original output of as inputs, to accuse a user who is likely to be one of the pirates. Let denote the set of the possible accused users. We define that the attack of the pirates has succeeded if and only if is not a pirate. This evaluation is expressed by an auxiliary algorithm , where 1 and 0 denote the success and the failure of the attack, respectively. The whole process is described by a flowchart given in Fig. 4 , where the set signifies a random source used by the algorithm . Hence, the attack success probability in the present setting is the probability (for a random element of ). In the numerical example, we consider the case that the number of pirates is 3, and we use a set of parameters and as in Table I which is determined in such a way that the attack success probability is bounded by when a random input for is chosen from uniformly at random. Further details will be described in Appendix B.
C. Improved Randomness Reduction Technique
By the shape of the bound for the differences between random and pseudorandom cases given by the main theorem, it is expected that the indistinguishability between the two cases will be improved if the amount of variation of information received by the adversary (i.e., the size of the input set for the attack algorithm) is diminished. Therefore, if we can divide the randomness used in a protocol into several pieces in such a way that only a smaller component of the information received by the adversary depends on each piece of the randomness, and we use an independent PRG to generate each of the pieces, then replacement of each perfectly random piece with pseudorandom one would be more indistinguishable than the original situation. By the "hybrid argument," the total indistinguishability between fully random and fully pseudorandom cases will be improved as well. From now, we explain this idea further by applying it to a concrete scheme of collusion-secure codes [21] mentioned in Section IV-B. Our numerical example will be given in the improved situation, which also includes the original situation as a special case.
To apply our idea, first we divide the set of bit positions in the codewords of the collusion-secure code into 
parts
. A key property of the scheme in [21] is that the probability distribution, generated by the algorithm , is the product of independent distributions each of which is used for generating the corresponding column of the codeword matrix (see Appendix B). Therefore, we can also divide the set of random input for into pieces in such a way that a part of the input chosen from is relevant to the columns in for the output of . The flowchart of this modified situation is shown in Fig. 5 (we present the picture only for the case for simplicity, but a more general case is analogous). Here, the th part of the whole output of is regarded as being generated by an algorithm with random input chosen from , and the th part of the pirates' codewords depends solely on . Note that the original situation corresponds to the case . In the situation, we would like to compare the following two cases: the input for is generated by the uniform random variable for every (the "fully random" case); and is generated by an independent PRG with uniformly random seed for every , where (the "fully pseudorandom" case). Now for and , let be a random variable on such that we have if and if , and put . Hence, and correspond to fully random and fully pseudorandom cases, respectively. By the hybrid argument, the difference between fully random and fully pseudorandom cases is bounded by the sum, over all with , of differences between the cases of and , while and differ only at the th components; and . Hence, it suffices to evaluate the indistinguishability for randomness reduction of each randomness piece . For the purpose, we apply Theorem III.1 to the aforementioned flowchart by setting and . Then, we have
Put
. Given elements , for and , the corresponding auxiliary flowchart is as shown in Fig. 6 . Now assume that each PRG is -secure with respect to a common complexity measure . Assume further that the complexity is bounded by a constant . Then by applying Theorem III.1, we have for each ; therefore, the difference between the attack success probabilities and in fully random and fully pseudorandom cases, respectively, is bounded by (8)
D. Numerical Examples
From now, we present numerical examples of the bound in (8) by using the objects and data in Sections IV-A and IV-B. First, for simplicity, we suppose that the partition of bit positions satisfies that , where we put and (hence, and ). We choose the sizes of in a balanced manner ; therefore, . On the other hand, we set each PRG to be a copy of the modified DDH generator introduced in the final paragraph of Section IV-A; therefore, we have where is as in (7) . In this case, each set consists of binary matrices of size (recall that the number of pirates is 3); therefore, and
(see Appendix A for the function ). Since the parameters for the collusion-secure codes have been chosen in Section IV-B in such a way that the attack success probability for fully random case is bounded by , it is desired to make the difference of attack success probabilities in fully random and fully pseudorandom cases significantly smaller than . In the numerical example, we would like to determine the parameters for the PRGs in such a way that the right-hand side of (9) is smaller than . On the other hand, since the seed set of consists of nonbinary elements, in order to compare the lengths of required perfect randomness in fully random and fully pseudorandom cases, we approximate the seeds of each by outputs of the map introduced in Section IV-A with uniformly random inputs; now, the new total seed length in fully pseudorandom case is bits. By Lemma IV.1, the statistical distance between the distribution over induced by outputs of copies of and the uniform distribution is bounded by . We would like to determine the parameters in such a way that is also smaller than . By the estimate of the bounds for the complexity given in Appendix C and the calculation of the other parameters in Appendix D, the numbers of required perfectly random bits in the original (fully random) and fully pseudorandom cases can be computed as in Table II. In Table II , for every choice of , the ratio of the seed length to the original number of required random bits decreases (namely, the effect of randomness reduction improves) as the number of users increases. More precisely, the original numbers of required random bits are almost linear in , while the seed lengths are almost independent of the values of . This can be interpreted as that the amount of required randomness "inessential" for the security increases as the number of users increases; see the fourth remark in Section III-E.
In the table, for each choice of user number and code length , the ratio is significantly low already in the case , i.e., when the improved technique presented in Section IV-C is not applied. This shows that even the plain PRG-based randomness reduction can be effective for information-theoretically secure cryptographic schemes, by using our indistinguishability evaluation technique.
Moreover, in the table the ratios for the cases , 5 are significantly better than the plain case . Note that the ratios for the case are better than the case further. Also, Fig. 7 shows a relation between the value and the approximated total seed length in the case (written in scientific E notation), where the approximation was performed in the same way as the argument in Appendix D. (By the aforementioned observation, the overall tendency would be similar for the other choices of .) In the graph, it can be shown that the approximated seed length takes the minimum value 236 220 at the case , which is approximately 2.57% of the original number of required random bits (this ratio would be further improved in the case of larger ) and is about 29 times as short as the plain case . These results show that our improved technique in Section IV-C indeed works effectively. We also no- tice that, as a by-product, our technique in Section IV-C reduces the computational cost of the PRGs as well, since the sizes of the Sophie-Germain primes used in the PRGs are significantly decreased as increases (see Appendix D).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed novel ideas and techniques for evaluation of indistinguishability between random and pseudorandom cases in PRG-based randomness reduction of cryptographic schemes. Our evaluation technique can prove the indistinguishability even against an adversary with computationally unbounded attack algorithm, especially when the amount of information received by the adversary is small; hence, it reveals that PRG-based randomness reduction can be effective for not only computationally secure but also information-theoretically secure schemes. In comparison to a preceding result of Dubrov and Ishai [11] , our result removes the requirement of the generalized notion of nb-PRGs and is effective for more general kinds of protocols. We presented the effectiveness of our result by giving numerical examples of randomness reduction for collusion-secure codes. Moreover, we also proposed another idea of dividing the required randomness into several smaller pieces for improving the effect of randomness reduction, and presented numerical examples to show that the idea also works effectively.
APPENDIX A DETAILS OF DDH GENERATOR
In this section, we supply the technical details for the DDH generator omitted in Section IV-A. Recall that a prime parameter is chosen in such a way that is also a prime number (i.e., is a safe prime). Let be the multiplicative group of nonzero quadratic residues modulo ; therefore, . We identify the set with via the bijection used in [13, Section 4.1] . Under the identification, the DDH generator has seed set and output set ; note that, in their construction, two elements and of are randomly chosen as well as the "seed" of the PRG [13, Section 3.1], and here we include those random elements and in the seed of the PRG. We omit further details of the construction of the PRG, since it is not relevant to our argument in the paper.
In [13] , indistinguishability of the PRG is evaluated by using the data of computer experiments by Lenstra and Verheul [18] . Accordingly, for each classical algorithm , we define to be the worst case running time of when executed on a fixed Pentium machine that was used in the experiments in [18] . (Note that it is not clear in [13] whether the running times are in the sense of average case or of worst case, and here we adopt the worst case ones for safety since worst case running time is longer than or equal to average-case running time.) The time unit is set to be 360 Pentium clock cycles that is, according to the experiment in [18] , approximately the time for one encryption in a software implementation of DES (see also [13, Section 2.4] is assumed to be the complexity of the best known algorithm for solving the DDH problem in , which is estimated according to the data in [18] as where (see [13, Section 2.4] ).
APPENDIX B DETAILS OF COLLUSION-SECURE CODES
In this section, we supply the technical details for the collusion-secure codes in [21] specialized to the case of three pirates, omitted in Section IV-B. First, for the codeword generation algorithm , we introduce a publicly known probability distribution that takes one of the two values and with equal probability , where
These values are approximations of the probability distribution given in [21, Definition 4] with approximation error less than (here, we require and to have short binary expressions rather than short decimal expressions; the same also holds for values and introduced below). Then outputs any one of the users with highest score. We notice that these values and are approximations of Tardos's scoring function (which is also used in [21] ) at and , respectively, with approximation error (the effects of such approximation errors are already considered in the security proof of [21] ).
Recall that we would like to choose the parameters in such a way that the attack success probability for the case that a random input for is chosen from uniformly at random is bounded by against pirates. Now by the results of the first part of [21, Theorem 1], we can calculate the code lengths as in Table I of Section IV-B, where we used  auxiliary values  ,  ,  ,  and in the calculation (see [21] for details of those auxiliary values).
APPENDIX C COMPLEXITY OF ALGORITHMS IN THE EXAMPLE
In this section, we estimate the computational complexity of the algorithm corresponding to the auxiliary flowchart given in Section IV-C. Here, we use the same complexity measure as mentioned in Appendix A.
First, we give a "pseudocode" for the algorithm in the following manner. Let , , be the indices of the three pirates. Here, we encode each digit of a pirated word in such a way that two-bit sequences 00, 01, and 10 represent "0," "1," and "?," respectively (hence one can determine whether or not by just one bit comparison at the lowest bit). The element consists of the bits with and . For each , the element consists of the values and bits . Since each is chosen from the two values and given in Section IV-B, here we encode each into such that . We also use the values and given in Section IV-B. In the aforementioned setting, we describe a pseudocode for together with an estimate of its complexity (see below for details) as follows, where denotes an operation to load the next bits from and jumping in the execution flow (implicitly used in loops and statements), which (together with any other missed issue on complexity) seem negligibly small and would be absorbed by the aforementioned overestimation. From the two rules, it follows that the worst case running time of a loop of the form " " is (over)estimated to be the sum of time units (composed of 1 initialization of the counter , increments for , and checks for the terminating condition) and the sum of running times of for all . In particular, if the running time of is constantly equal to time units, then the estimated running time of this loop is time units. The aforementioned estimates of running times of each line, each loop, and each statement are thus obtained. By summing the estimated running times presented at lines , , , , and , we have where Hence, we have By substituting it for (9), the right-hand side of (9) is now equal to
APPENDIX D DETAILS OF THE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we determine the appropriate parameters for DDH generators in order to complete the numerical example in Section IV-D.
First, by the pseudocode for the algorithm given in Appendix C, the necessary and sufficient bit length of the input is . Hence, the total number of required random bits in fully random case is , and the parameters and for should satisfy . For simplicity, we suppose that the integer is as small as possible, i.e., we set . We determine the total seed lengths and other parameters in fully pseudorandom cases under the conditions that the quantity in (10) should be smaller than and we should have . Table III shows the results of calculation for three cases . In the table, "difference" signifies the sum of the quantity in (10) and , and "ratio" signifies the ratio of the seed length in fully pseudorandom case to the number of required random bits in the original (fully random) case. For each case in the table where the choice of Sophie-Germain prime is specified, we used the following values:
where the last four Sophie-Germain primes are quoted from the July 2009 version of a list by Caldwell [7] , while the first one is quoted from the September 2008 version of that list. On the other hand, for each of the remaining cases, an approximation of was performed since the authors could not find in the literature a concrete Sophie-Germain prime with appropriate size. In such a case, we calculated the "difference" and the corresponding total seed length under the assumption that both and vanish and . This approximation would be allowable, since and are not significantly far from in the five cases with precise values of .
